From that moment on, Marshal Piłsudski once again became the decisive factor in Polish political life. He initiated a slow and systematic reform of the state and the simultaneous spiritual emancipation of citizens from the burdensome legacy of the times of political slavery. The strengthening of the executive power, the internal consolidation of the state and the elimination of the invasive parliamentarism: these are the means by which Piłsudski aimed at the realization of his aims. The first step on this path was the law of August 2, 1926 which introduced into the constitution of 1921 some amendments intended to expand the power of the president of the republic and to stem the excessive interference of the parliament in the affairs of the government. But the attempts, undertaken by the governments of K. Bartel (May 15-October 2, 1926) and Piłsudski himself (October 2, 1926-27 June 1928), to have some of the parties collaborate in the reform of the state too. Not only the parties of the right and of the center, but also those of the left, which at first gave their support to Piłsudski, soon began a systematic activity against the authoritarian and strong government that the marshal wished to establish. Unable to find a way of understanding with the ancient parties, Piłsudski’s government then proceeded to create its own political group, which was to bring together all those who were motivated by the common desire to follow the marshal’s directives without reservations.Blok Bezpartyjny) and obtained 135 seats out of a total of 444. The losses of the right and the center were serious, while the left returned to the chamber with 130, rather than 100 deputies. Even clearer was the success of Piłsudski’s supporters in the Senate. Attempts to agree with the parties were repeated by the Prime Minister Bartel also in the following two years, but once again without result. On the contrary, the opposition passed to a decisive offensive, both in the sejm and in the country, where demonstrations hostile to Piłsudski were organized. This opposition was especially bitter against two of Piłsudski’s closest collaborators, Świtalski and Sławek, who were presidents of the council of ministers in 1929 and 1930. The marshal then decided to take back the reins of power directly in his hands and to act vigorously against his opponents. The opposition leaders, mainly from the left-wing parties, were arrested on 10 September 1930 and locked up in the Brześć fortress. At the same time, the terrorist action of the Ukrainians was also repressed in the eastern areas of Little Poland.
According to vaultedwatches.com, the parliament was dissolved and the new elections this time gave a majority to the government bloc both in the sejm (247 deputies) and in the senate (76). The left and center parties were vanquished and the national minorities (Ukrainians, White Koreans, Germans, Jews and Lithuanians) reduced, in the sejm, to only 33 seats, while in the previous chamber they had obtained 81. Only now the government of Piłsudski could proceed without hindrance of any kind to the undertaken work of state reform and national consolidation. At the head of the individual cabinets he chose only his most proven collaborators: Colonels Sławek (4 December 1930 – 26 May 1931; and a third time from 28 March 1935) and Prystor (27 May 1931 – 9 May 1933), besides Jędrzejewicz (May 10, 1933 – May 13, 1934) and Kozłowski (May 19, 1934 – March 28, 1935). The changes in the cabinets, in which Piłsudski always reserved the War Ministry for himself, thus did not affect the continuity of the regime at all, and were rather aimed at making the heads of the Piłsudskian group aware of the technique of government. Prystor devoted its activity above all to the fight against the economic crisis that it tried to stem with a forced deflation and with the preservation of the stability of the currency; Jędrzejewicz turned his primary attention to a radical scholastic and educational reform; Kozłowski to the definitive elaboration of the constitutional reform. Prystor devoted its activity above all to the fight against the economic crisis that it tried to stem with a forced deflation and with the preservation of the stability of the currency; Jędrzejewicz turned his primary attention to a radical scholastic and educational reform; Kozłowski to the definitive elaboration of the constitutional reform. Prystor devoted its activity above all to the fight against the economic crisis that it tried to stem with a forced deflation and with the preservation of the stability of the currency; Jędrzejewicz turned his primary attention to a radical scholastic and educational reform; Kozłowski to the definitive elaboration of the constitutional reform.
In the social field, governments from 1926 onwards opposed the class struggle, the supremacy of interests of one class over another, the concentration of wealth in a few hands, and tried to defend the economically weaker classes in the face of attempts at trusts. banking and industrial companies. At the same time these governments introduce improvements in the agricultural field by dividing large estates, reclaiming uncultivated land and increasing the surface of the minimum powers. In this period, the process of unification between the territories already subjected to the three foreign powers, both in the juridical and in the political and administrative fields, took a quick step forward. Finally, Piłsudski’s results in the reorganization and war preparation of the army are noteworthy.
The internal consolidation of Poland and its increased military power made possible, after 1926, a more effective activity in foreign policy. In this field Piłsudski, whose directives were adhered to by the foreign ministers Zaleski (from 15 May 1926 to 2 November 1932) and Colonel Beck, aimed at the complete emancipation of Poland from external influences. For this reason foreign policy, which in the post-war period had been carried out in strict adherence with French politics, in recent times assumed an attitude of considerable independence in the face of Paris.
Piłsudski instead directed his efforts towards a constant improvement of relations with neighboring powers. On 25 August 1932 he concluded the non-aggression pact with the USSR The following year he actively worked for the realization of the Litvinov protocol of non-aggression, containing the definition of the aggressor, signed on 3 July 1933 in London between the Soviet government, Poland, Romania and the Baltic States. On May 5, 1934, the non-aggression pact with the USSR was extended for another ten years. The identical effort directed towards Germany materialized in the declaration of January 26, 1934 which commits the two states for ten years to non-aggression, to the maintenance of good neighborly relations and to the resolution, on the basis of direct negotiations, of any conflicts.. With these two agreements, Poland believes that it has achieved the greatest possible security for itself in its present condition. It therefore assumed a critical attitude towards the Eastern pact, promoted by France, believing that the clause of mutual assistance in the event of aggression would imply obligations for it of a scope that is difficult to specify and in any case higher than those which it feels willing to do. take on oneself. Another fundamental reason for Poland’s aversion to the Eastern Pact is to be found in the fact that its implementation would oblige Poland to allow, in the event of an attack by France by Germany, the transit of the armies of the USSR on its territory.
A proof of the independent attitude that Marshal Pilsudski had wanted to adopt in carrying out his foreign policy is also given by the fact that the Polish government declared itself, with unilateral denunciation, dissolved from the commitments it had to face with national minorities for stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles.
On May 12, 1935 Piłsudski died. With this date the first period of the history of the resurrected Poland ends.